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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.   
In United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), 
the Supreme Court held that subsection (k) of the supervised 
release statute (18 U.S.C. § 3583) violated the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Appellant Eric 
Seighman claims subsection (g) of that statute must suffer the 
same fate. Because there are pivotal differences between the 
two subsections, we disagree and reject Seighman’s challenge 
to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).  
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I 
 In 2014, Seighman pleaded guilty to a counterfeiting 
conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, a Class D felony 
carrying a maximum prison term of 60 months. The District 
Court sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment with 36 
months of supervised release to follow. As a condition of that 
release, Seighman was prohibited from “unlawfully 
possess[ing] a controlled substance.” App. 30. 
 Soon after he left prison, Seighman went astray by 
buying heroin, testing positive for opiates, and failing to 
comply with drug treatment. Upon petition of the United States 
Probation Office, the District Court revoked Seighman’s 
supervision and sentenced him to another 24 months’ 
imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. The 
District Court also strongly recommended significant and 
intensive drug treatment for Seighman. 
 After his second release from prison, Seighman 
transitioned to Renewal, Inc., a residential reentry center. 
There he violated his supervised release once again. On August 
7, 2019, the day after Seighman’s second term of supervised 
release began, the Probation Office petitioned the District 
Court to issue a warrant for Seighman because he brought 
heroin into Renewal. The next week, the Probation Office filed 
supplemental petitions alleging that Seighman had committed 
two more violations: leaving Renewal without permission and 
buying illegal drugs.  
 The Probation Office calculated Seighman’s revocation 
sentencing range as 21–27 months’ imprisonment. But because 
Seighman’s crime of conviction was a Class D felony, 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) limited his maximum term of 
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imprisonment to 24 months. The Government concurred with 
the Probation Office. 
 Seighman objected to the Probation Office’s 
calculation. He argued that because his counterfeiting 
conspiracy conviction permitted a maximum of 60 months in 
prison, he could be sentenced to no more than six months in 
prison (since he had served 54 months already). On 
Seighman’s view, any sentence of more than six months would 
require a jury trial under the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Haymond. 
 The District Court held a sentencing hearing, at which 
Seighman argued his objection. The prosecutor responded that 
“revocation and a term of imprisonment are mandatory under 
[subsection (g)] because of drug possession.” App. 98–99. He 
also asked the Court to “place on the record if it agrees it would 
revoke and impose a term of imprisonment even if that was not 
mandatory under the statute.” App. 99. The Court found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Seighman possessed a 
controlled substance. It then “agree[d] with the government 
that supervised release both must and should be revoked” and 
sentenced Seighman to 24 months’ imprisonment. App. 4, 103–
04. 
 The District Court rejected Seighman’s objection for 
three reasons. First, it cited a “swath of court decisions 
[rejecting] the notion that we should aggregate the sentences, 
both original and on supervised release, to ensure that the 
underlying statutory maximum sentence is not breached.” App. 
105. Second, it noted “the Haymond [C]ourt took pains to limit 
its decision to [subsection (k)].” Id. Finally, it explained 
“Section 3583(e) . . . governs supervised release revocation 
proceedings generally, including [Seighman’s],  . . .  [and] does 
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not contain any similar mandatory minimums triggered by 
judge-found facts.” App. 105–06. In sum, the District Court 
said it was “not willing to go where the Supreme Court refused 
to.” App. 106. 
 Seighman timely appealed.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over purely legal questions. See United 
States v. Ware, 694 F.3d 527, 531 (3d Cir. 2012).  
In this appeal, Seighman principally argues that the 
mandatory imprisonment aspect of subsection (g) is 
unconstitutional. But he never raised that argument in the 
District Court, so we review for plain error. See United States 
v. Lopez, 650 F.3d 952, 959 (3d Cir. 2011). Plain error exists 
when an error is clear at the time it was made and it affected 
the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 732–33 (1993). If those conditions are met, we may 
reverse only if the error affected the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of the proceeding. Id. at 732. 
III 
 We begin by briefly summarizing the role of supervised 
release in the federal criminal justice system. Under the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, whenever a federal court 
sentences a criminal defendant to a term of imprisonment, it 
may include “a requirement that the defendant be placed on a 
term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). Federal 
courts do just that in almost all criminal cases. In a multi-year 
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study of federal sentences imposed after the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), the United States Sentencing Commission reported that 
over 99 percent of federal sentences for over one year’s 
imprisonment also included a term of supervised release. See 
Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n (July 2010), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-publications/2010/20100722_ 
Supervised_Release.pdf. The maximum length of a 
defendant’s supervised release term usually depends on the 
seriousness of his crime of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(b). For example, a defendant who committed a Class D 
felony cannot be sentenced to a term of supervised release 
exceeding three years. See id. § 3583(b)(2). 
Because supervised release is a system of post-
conviction monitoring intended to facilitate the offender’s 
reintegration into society, probation officers have discretion 
over whether to report an offender’s violations of supervised 
release. If violations are severe or pervasive enough, the 
probation officer will alert the district court. In those cases, if 
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated his supervised release, the court may revoke 
it and “require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the 
term of supervised release authorized by statute” for his crime 
of conviction. See id. § 3583(e)(3).  Generally, the court has 
discretion whether to sentence the defendant to imprisonment, 
and the maximum length of a defendant’s sentence depends on 
the seriousness of his crime of conviction. See id. For example, 
a defendant who committed a Class D felony cannot be 
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sentenced to “more than 2 years in prison” for violating his 
supervised release. See id. 
 Having explained federal supervised release generally, 
we turn to the Supreme Court’s decision last year in Haymond. 
There, the Court declared 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) unconstitutional 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Subsection (k) states:   
(k) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the 
authorized term of supervised release for any 
offense under section 1201 involving a minor 
victim, and for any offense under section 1591, 
1594(c), 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2250, 
2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, 
2423, or 2425, is any term of years not less than 
5, or life. If a defendant required to register under 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act commits any criminal offense under chapter 
109A, 110, or 117, or section 1201 or 1591, for 
which imprisonment for a term longer than 1 
year can be imposed, the court shall revoke the 
term of supervised release and require the 
defendant to serve a term of imprisonment under 
subsection (e)(3) without regard to the exception 
contained therein. Such term shall be not less 
than 5 years. 
Id. § 3583(k) (emphasis added). 
 In Haymond, a jury found Andre Haymond guilty of 
possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(b)(2), which authorizes up to ten years in prison. See 139 
S. Ct. at 2373. The judge sentenced Haymond to 38 months’ 
imprisonment, followed by 120 months of supervised release. 
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See id. Haymond completed his prison sentence, but shortly 
thereafter, the government searched his computers and 
cellphone and found “59 images that appeared to be child 
pornography.” Id. at 2374. A judge found by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Haymond “knowingly downloaded and 
possessed” thirteen of the images and, because subsection (k) 
applies to possession of child pornography, imposed the 
mandatory minimum prison term of five years. Id. at 2374–75. 
The sentencing judge did so unwillingly, noting that “[w]ere it 
not for [subsection (k)’s] mandatory minimum,  . . . he 
‘probably would have sentenced in the range of two years or 
less.’” Id. at 2375. Under subsection (k), Haymond could have 
been sentenced to life in prison even though his crime of 
conviction that triggered his supervised release violation 
carried a ten-year maximum. Id. at 2373. 
 Haymond appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which concluded subsection (k) 
violated his right to trial by jury because it imposed “a new and 
higher mandatory minimum resting only on facts found by a 
judge by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 2375. A 
divided Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 2373. Writing for a 
plurality, Justice Gorsuch defined a “prosecution” as “the 
process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before 
a legal tribunal,” and a “crime” as an “act[] to which the law 
affixes . . . punishment.” Id. at 2376 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). He then observed that historically the 
jury has “exercise[d] supervisory authority over the judicial 
function by limiting the judge’s power to punish.” Id. And 
since Apprendi, the Court has “not hesitated to strike 
down . . . innovations that fail to respect the jury’s supervisory 
function.” Id. at 2377. For example, in Alleyne, the Court held 
that facts increasing a defendant’s minimum punishment must 
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be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2378. 
Applying Alleyne, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the “facts 
the judge found [in Haymond’s case] increased the legally 
prescribed range of allowable sentences in violation of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Id. (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  
 Justice Gorsuch limited his analysis to the 
constitutionality of subsection (k) under Alleyne. See id. at 
2383 (“As we have emphasized, our decision is limited to 
[subsection (k)]—an unusual provision enacted little more than 
a decade ago—and the Alleyne problem raised by its 5-year 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.”). He declined to 
address the constitutionality of subsection (k) under Apprendi, 
or the constitutionality of subsection (g). See id. at 2379 n.4, 
2382 n.7. 
 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. His opinion 
is the Court’s holding because it supplies the narrowest ground 
supporting the judgment. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977). Justice Breyer agreed with the dissent that 
“the role of the judge in a supervised-release proceeding is 
consistent with traditional parole.” Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 
2385 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). He also 
cautioned against “transplant[ing] the Apprendi line of cases to 
the supervised-release context,” citing “potentially 
destabilizing consequences.” Id. He nevertheless agreed with 
the plurality that subsection (k) is unconstitutional. His 
succinct concurrence merits quotation at length because it 
governs our analysis below: 
Revocation of supervised release is typically 
understood as ‘‘part of the penalty for the initial 
offense.’’ Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 
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700, 120 S. Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000). 
The consequences that flow from violation of the 
conditions of supervised release are first and 
foremost considered sanctions for the 
defendant’s ‘‘breach of trust’’—his ‘‘failure to 
follow the court-imposed conditions’’ that 
followed his initial conviction—not ‘‘for the 
particular conduct triggering the revocation as if 
that conduct were being sentenced as new federal 
criminal conduct.’’ United States Sentencing 
Commission, Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, 
intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2018); see post, at 2392 – 2393. 
Consistent with that view, the consequences for 
violation of conditions of supervised release 
under § 3583(e), which governs most 
revocations, are limited by the severity of the 
original crime of conviction, not the conduct that 
results in revocation. See § 3583(e)(3) 
(specifying that a defendant may as a 
consequence of revocation serve no ‘‘more than 
5 years in prison if the offense that resulted in the 
term of supervised release is a class A felony, 
[no] more than 3 years in prison if . . . a class B 
felony,’’ and so on).  
[Subsection (k)] is difficult to reconcile with this 
understanding of supervised release. In 
particular, three aspects of this provision, 
considered in combination, lead me to think it is 
less like ordinary revocation and more like 
punishment for a new offense, to which the jury 
right would typically attach. First, [subsection 
(k)] applies only when a defendant commits a 
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discrete set of federal criminal offenses specified 
in the statute. Second, [subsection (k)] takes 
away the judge’s discretion to decide whether 
violation of a condition of supervised release 
should result in imprisonment and for how long. 
Third, [subsection (k)] limits the judge’s 
discretion in a particular manner: by imposing a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 
‘‘not less than 5 years’’ upon a judge’s finding 
that a defendant has ‘‘commit[ted] any’’ listed 
‘‘criminal offense.’’ 
Taken together, these features of § 3583(k) more 
closely resemble the punishment of new criminal 
offenses, but without granting a defendant the 
rights, including the jury right, that attend a new 
criminal prosecution. And in an ordinary 
criminal prosecution, a jury must find facts that 
trigger a mandatory minimum prison term. 
Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103, 133 S. Ct. 2151.  
 
Id. at 2386 (emphasis added). 
IV 
Citing Haymond, Seighman claims the District Court 
committed plain error when it revoked his supervised release 
and sentenced him to 24 months in prison. He argues 
subsection (g) is “less like ordinary revocation and more like 
punishment for a new offense, to which the jury right would 
typically attach.” Id. And he contends that subsection (g) 
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“shares all three of the features that rendered [subsection (k)] 
unconstitutional.” Seighman Br. 13–14. We are unpersuaded. 
Subsection (g) states: 
(g) Mandatory revocation for possession of 
controlled substance or firearm or for refusal 
to comply with drug testing.—If the 
defendant— 
(1) possesses a controlled substance in violation 
of the condition set forth in subsection (d); 
(2) possesses a firearm, as such term is defined 
in section 921 of this title, in violation of Federal 
law, or otherwise violates a condition of 
supervised release prohibiting the defendant 
from possessing a firearm; 
(3) refuses to comply with drug testing imposed 
as a condition of supervised release; or 
(4) as a part of drug testing, tests positive for 
illegal controlled substances more than 3 times 
over the course of 1 year; 
the court shall revoke the term of supervised 
release and require the defendant to serve a term 
of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term 
of imprisonment authorized under subsection 
(e)(3). 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (emphasis added).  
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Regarding Justice Breyer’s first factor, we note that 
subsection (g) does not apply to a “discrete set of federal 
criminal offenses specified in the statute.” Haymond, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). By its 
terms, subsection (g) applies to conduct that does not rise to the 
level of a federal criminal offense, such as “refus[ing] to 
comply with drug testing” or repeatedly “test[ing] positive for 
illegal controlled substances.” Recognizing this weakness, 
Seighman argues that because his supervised release was 
“mandatorily revoked for the discrete offense of drug 
possession,” we “need not trouble [ourselves]” with the fact 
that subsection (g) also applies to noncriminal conduct. Reply 
Br. 2–3. But Justice Breyer’s concurrence counsels in favor of 
reading subsection (g) holistically: he stressed that subsection 
(k) applies “only when a defendant commits a discrete set of 
federal criminal offenses specified in the statute.” Haymond, 
139 S. Ct. at 2386 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The differences between the two subsections become 
even clearer when we consider Justice Breyer’s second and 
third points of emphasis. Seighman is correct that subsection 
(g), like subsection (k), mandates imprisonment. But the 
former requires only one day in prison, while the latter 
mandated at least five years in prison.  
Even more significantly, subsection (g) does not limit 
the judge’s discretion in the same “manner” as subsection (k). 
Subsection (k) mandates five years’ imprisonment and 
empowers the judge to impose a life sentence regardless of how 
serious (or minor) the defendant’s crime of conviction was. By 
contrast, subsection (g) imposes a mandatory term of 
imprisonment of just one day, and the maximum length of the 
defendant’s sentence depends on the seriousness of his crime 
of conviction under subsection (e)(3). Considering these three 
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factors “in combination,” we are convinced that subsection (g) 
is more like ordinary revocation and less like punishment for a 
new offense. Cf. id.1 
Seighman insists the one-day mandatory minimum 
“alone” violates the jury right, and the “length of the 
mandatory sentence is irrelevant.” Reply Br. 3–4. We disagree. 
Justice Breyer stressed the length of subsection (k)’s 
mandatory minimum repeatedly. See Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 
2386 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). And because he 
emphasized that the three factors he applied are to be 
considered “in combination,” id., it cannot be true that one 
factor “alone” is outcome-determinative. 
Had we reached the opposite conclusion, Seighman’s 
appeal would still fail. The novelty of the question presented 
precludes relief under the stringent Olano standard because 
any error would not have been plain. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 
734. And because the District Court imposed a sentence well 
beyond a day in prison (24 months), it’s clear that Seighman’s 
substantial rights were not affected by subsection (g)’s 
 
1  Since Haymond, only a few federal courts have 
addressed the constitutionality of subsection (g) and their 
decisions are consistent with ours. See, e.g., United States v. 
Wilson, 939 F.3d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. 
Ct. 1242 (2020) (declining to extend Haymond to subsection 
(g) in response to double jeopardy argument); United States v. 
Badgett, 957 F.3d 536, 540–41 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding district 
court did not plainly err by applying subsection (g) because no 
court has yet extended Haymond to that subsection); United 
States v. Hernandez, 2019 WL 6324743, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019) (upholding subsection (g) after applying Justice Breyer’s 
three factors). 
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mandatory minimum. Id. Indeed, the District Court’s 
frustration with Seighman’s repeated breaches of trust resulted 
in a term of imprisonment to the maximum extent the statute 
permits. 
For these reasons, the District Court committed no 
error, much less plain error, when it sentenced Seighman under 
subsection (g). 
VI 
 Seighman also argues that his sentence is 
unconstitutional under Apprendi. As counsel rightly conceded 
in his brief, however, Seighman is merely preserving this 
argument for Supreme Court review because Justice Breyer’s 
refusal to “transplant the Apprendi line of cases to the 
supervised-release context” forecloses it. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Seighman Br. 18. Justice Breyer’s opinion is consistent with 
our own precedent, where we have rejected the argument that 
a defendant can establish an Apprendi violation by 
“aggregat[ing]  . . . revocation sentences and then compar[ing] 
them to” a statutory maximum. United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 
847, 854 (3d Cir. 2006). Revocation sentences (other than 
those under subsection (k)) are “part of the penalty for the 
initial offense,” and do not increase the penalty under 
Apprendi. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700–01. At least four of our 
sister circuits agree. See United States v. Doka, 955 F.3d 290, 
293–95 (2d Cir. 2020) (reaffirming that “the Constitution 
permits judges to revoke a defendant’s term of supervised 
release [and impose a new prison term] after finding, under a 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that the defendant 
violated his or her conditions of supervised release”); United 
States v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding 
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“the rule in Apprendi does not apply to a sentence imposed 
under § 3583 following the revocation of a supervised 
release”); United States v. Hampton, 633 F.3d 334, 341–42 
(5th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 
F.3d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). 
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm Seighman’s 
judgment of sentence.2 
 
 2 Seighman also appealed his judgment of sentence in 
case no. 17-3368. That appeal is moot in light of our opinion 
in case no. 19-3203. Oral Argument 1:01:15.   
